REINFORCED POLARIZATION: HOW THE ROBERTS COURT’S RECENT DECISION TO INVALIDATE THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S COVERAGE FORMULA WILL EXACERBATE THE DIVISIONS THAT BEDEVIL U.S. SOCIETY

M. AKRAM FAIZER

As America focuses on the reasons behind the tragic August 9, 2014 killing of an African-American teenager, Michael Brown, by a White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, commentators have seized upon the fact that fifty of the fifty-three officers employed by the Ferguson Police Department are White, while Ferguson is a municipality that is nearly 70% African-American. Ferguson, moreover, is a municipality with a White mayor and a city council that is five-sixths White. This is most likely because Ferguson’s African-American voter turnout for municipal elections is only 6%, which can partially be explained by the fact that Ferguson schedules its municipal elections during off-years, when racial minority voter participation is particularly low as compared to Whites. Notwithstanding the country’s election and reelection of its first African-American President, this is paradigmatic in today’s U.S.—a country with extremely high levels of racial political polarization and very low rates of racial minority voter participation in midterm and off-year elections.

1 Professor M. Akram Faizer is an Associate Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University’s Duncan School of Law (“DSOL”). He would very much like to thank his wife, Melanie Faizer, for her loving support of him, DSOL Librarian Ann W. Long for her help in editing this piece, and DSOL student Jonathan Connor for his research assistance. Professor Faizer would also like to thank the Cumberland Law Review for its help in preparing this piece for publication.


3 Id.

4 See Ian Millhiser, This Is the Most Important Reform Ferguson Can Enact to Give its Black Residents a Voice, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 18, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/08/18/3472278/this-is-the-most-important-reform-ferguson-can-enact-to-prevent-another-standoff/.

5 See id. (discussing the disparity in African-American voter turnout during midterm and odd-year elections).
explains many of the country’s enduring pathologies, including inordinately high levels of socioeconomic inequality and very poor educational outcomes. What is unequivocally true, however, is that U.S. democracy is nowhere near a postracial paradigm that merits ending federal supervision of state election procedures.

In *Shelby County v. Holder*, Chief Justice Roberts issued a decision that effectively neuters the Voting Rights Act (VRA), arguably the most important piece of civil rights legislation in the nation’s history, enacted to ensure racial minority voting rights. His majority opinion invalidated VRA Section 4, which provided the coverage formula for determining which states, known as “covered jurisdictions,” are required to obtain preclearance from either a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (DDC) or the U.S. Attorney General (AG) before changing their voting procedures. The Roberts Court overturned the VRA because—among other things—the VRA’s preclearance formula ostensibly contradicted what the Chief Justice asserts is the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States,” which is nowhere stated in the U.S. Constitution. This statement is incredible in its naivety and disregard of the nation’s history and continued practice of pronounced racial discrimination. Although conservatives have lauded the immediate judicial outcome of the Court’s decision in *Shelby County*, the Court’s decisions should not only

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8 See id. at 2631.


10 *Shelby Cnty.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2629–31.

11 See 52 U.S.C § 10304 (2012).


13 See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, *The Left’s Nonsense Analysis of the Voting Rights Act Case,*
be evaluated according to their apparent desirability, but also according to their institutional legitimacy, jurisprudential soundness, and how they will affect and interact with both U.S. government and society. By these measures, the Court’s decision in Shelby County is an altogether problematic use of judicial review because it risks precipitating a backlash against racial minority voting rights by state legislatures in a country with an inordinately high level of racial political polarization and a pronounced history of racial discrimination. In short, the decision will exacerbate rather than bridge the racial and socioeconomic divides that bedevil U.S. society.

Shelby County involved the Alabama County’s challenge to the constitutionality of the coverage formula used in the VRA’s most recent 2006 reauthorization, officially known as the “Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Reauthorization and Amendments Act,” because the reauthorization’s coverage formula was largely unchanged from the coverage formula used in previous VRA reauthorizations.14 In effect, the fundamental issue presented was whether Congress could still reauthorize the VRA’s preclearance provision as applied to covered jurisdictions under such circumstances.15 Shelby County and jurisprudential conservatives relied on previous court decisions that parsimoniously interpreted Congressional legislative power under the Reconstruction Amendments and alleged that Congress had no authority to reauthorize the coverage formula because minority voter registration levels and ballot access had markedly improved in recent years.16 Liberals and VRA proponents, on the other hand, relying on the Court’s earlier VRA jurisprudence, disputed this assertion, arguing that Congressional power to enact the coverage formula under the

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14 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621, 2630–31.
15 See id. at 2627–28.
16 Id. at 2623–26.
Fifteenth Amendment is sufficiently broad to enact rational legislation of its choosing.\textsuperscript{17} The Court sided with Shelby County and conservative VRA opponents.\textsuperscript{18}

This article is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the historical background of racial discrimination in voting rights that led to the VRA’s enactment in 1965 based on Congress’s authority to pass legislation under the Fifteenth Amendment. The second part describes the current predicament of U.S. government and society and concludes that, although the U.S. remains the world’s most powerful country, it is beset by many problems: namely, pronounced racial and socio-economic cleavages that are, in part, exacerbated by the country’s Byzantine political system that excessively empowers the wealthiest Americans and minimizes the number and political impact of racial minority votes. The third section analyzes the VRA’s different provisions and concludes that, although voting jurisdictions have eliminated first generation voting barriers such as poll taxes and literacy tests, it is now second generation barriers that harm racial minority voting rights—especially in states with a particularly pronounced problem of racial political polarization that requires either a more prominent role in federal supervision of state and local elections or a complete rethink of election procedures to increase the political power of racial minority voters. The fourth part describes \textit{Shelby County} in detail and concludes that the Chief Justice’s decision solely focuses on first generation voting barriers to naively conclude the Court should use its judicial review powers to sweepingly invalidate the most important piece of voting rights legislation in the country’s history. It concludes that the effect of \textit{Shelby County} will most likely result in states harmfully exploiting and exacerbating the nation’s racial divisions for partisan political purposes, and further proposes that the country replace its current single member plurality system for electing legislative candidates with a modified proportional representation system that is currently used in many Western European countries.

I. THE VRA AND THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT – A BRIEF

\textsuperscript{17} See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Shelby Cnty.}, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
BACKGROUND

President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA into law after it was passed by supermajorities in both Congressional houses to ensure, at the height of the Civil Rights movement, franchise rights for African-Americans and other racial minorities that had systematically been denied voting rights by recalcitrant state and local governments. The legislation was enacted based on the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which was enacted and ratified during Reconstruction to both declare that race can no longer be used to deny voting rights and provide Congress with necessary legislative power to protect this right against racist state governments. Section 1 provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of...
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

The enforcement provision, Section 2, provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

Although the Fifteenth Amendment historically altered U.S. federalism by giving Congress the power to police state elections, Congress, until it passed the VRA, had failed to enact substantive voting-rights legislation for nearly 100 years as segregationists dominated both houses of Congress and prioritized the maintenance of a racial hierarchy in the South. As a result, Blacks were effectively disenfranchised in the South because they were consistently prevented from registering to vote and serving on juries by Whites intent on preserving what was known as "Jim Crow." Indeed, as the liberal former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has written, the lack of voting rights legislation until the VRA’s enactment meant that the three-fifths clause—which in Article I, Section 2 shamelessly countenanced slavery in the U.S. Constitution and increased Southern representation in the House of Representatives by three-fifths of the number of slaves within Southern States—was replaced after Reconstruction by a southern 100% bonus because African-Americans, who were systematically prevented from registering to vote, were counted as voting citizens for Congressional apportionment purposes. This artificially increased the national political power of Southern Whites and should contextualize the Chief Justice’s assertion, in Shelby County, that the U.S. Constitution somehow mandates equality among the several States.

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21 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
26 See id.
Justice Stevens wrote, “[B]oth the underrepresentation of blacks and the overrepresentation of white supremacists in the South during that period contradict the notion that the ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States’ is a part of our unwritten Constitution.”

The VRA altered this paradigm by giving the federal government some supervisory power over state and local election procedures. The act can be summarized as follows:

1. The VRA, currently codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301 to 10314, proscribes denial or abridgement of voting rights on account of race or color and authorizes the AG or any aggrieved person to commence proceedings to enforce voting guarantees under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, provided that nothing can be construed to require members of a protected class from being elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

2. Section 2, amended in 1982, prohibits the drawing of election lines in ways that improperly dilute minority voting power through measures such as at-large voting districts that minimize the ability of racial minorities to elect their chosen candidates. Although Section 2 prohibits vote denial, its focus has been on the drawing of legislative district lines to dilute the political effect of racial minority votes.

3. Section 3 allows the AG to commence a proceeding to “bail-in” a jurisdiction that is not included by VRA Section 4’s coverage formula and petition a federal court to seek injunctive relief to prevent a voting jurisdiction from enacting changes to

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27 Id. Justice Stevens explained further:

[T]he terrorist tactics of the Ku Klux Klan and other groups devoted to the cause of white supremacy effectively prevented any significant voting at all by African-Americans, thus replacing a prewar three-fifths bonus with a post-Reconstruction bonus of 100 percent of the nonvoting African-Americans. Thus, for almost a century—until the VRA was enacted during President Johnson’s administration—the southern states’ representation in Congress was significantly larger than it should have been.

Id.


29 See id. at § 2 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)).

30 Id.
voting procedures such as, among other things, literacy tests, intimidation, threats and other voting obstructions.31

4. Section 4(b) provides, among other things, for a formula that determines which jurisdictions, known as “covered jurisdictions,” must seek preclearance from either the AG or the DDC before they can implement voting procedure changes of any type.32

5. Section 4(a), a procedure whereby these “covered jurisdictions” can seek “bailout” from the coverage formula so that they no longer need to obtain preclearance before implementing voting procedure changes.33

6. VRA Section 5 outlines the procedures that “covered jurisdictions” must undertake to obtain preclearance from either the AG or DDC to implement voting procedure changes.34

In short, the VRA provides federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce voting rights in two markedly different situations. The first involves the use of federal courts nationwide to stop allegedly discriminatory voting changes and obstructions. This is known as the “bail-in” provision of VRA Section 3, which allows the AG or any “aggrieved person” to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment “in any State or political subdivision the court finds that violations” have occurred.35 Put simply, the “bail-in” provision authorizes a federal court that has granted equitable relief for violations of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment voting guarantees to retain jurisdiction for a period of time, during which the court may require the violating voting jurisdiction to get authorization from it before making changes to certain voting standards, practices, or procedures.36 The VRA’s “bail-in” provision was not directly affected by Shelby County.37

31 See id. at § 3 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (2012)).
34 See id. at § 5 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012)).
35 See id. at § 3(c) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2012)).
36 See id.; Crum, supra note 32, at 1999.
37 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
The constitutionality of the more important VRA provision that determines those jurisdictions, known as "covered jurisdictions," that must seek preclearance from either the DDC or the AG before implementing voting procedure changes was, however, invalidated by Shelby County.38 The "covered jurisdictions" formula of Section 4(b) was based on a Congressional determination as to the jurisdictions that have demonstrated a sufficient historical pattern and practice of racial discrimination in the provision of franchise rights, to subject them to VRA Section 5's preclearance requirements.39 The coverage formula was based on observed voting patterns in the 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections40 and has remained largely unchanged in subsequent VRA reauthorizations, notwithstanding the fact that ballot access has markedly changed nationwide, such that the states included within the "covered jurisdictions" formula frequently exceed non-covered jurisdictions in voter turnout levels and in the number of racial minority elected officials.41 Seizing on this discrepancy, the Court sweepingly invalidated VRA Section 4(b)'s coverage formula as unconstitutional based on a narrow conclusion that Congressional legislative power under the Fifteenth Amendment is remedial and invalid if not congruent and proportional to an existing constitutional violation.42 As set forth more fully below, this is based on a conservative and parsimonious reading of Congressional legislative power under the Fifteenth Amendment that liberals argue strenuously against.43 Moreover, Shelby County omitted consideration of the previously covered jurisdictions' unhealthy correlation between political partisanship and race, and how this has engendered problematic

39 See Crum, supra note 32, at 1999; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(b) to 5 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(b) to 10304 (2012)).
40 Crum, supra note 32, at 1999.
42 See id. at 2629, 2631.
43 Compare id. at 2629 (2013) (Roberts, J., majority) (stating that Congress is limited to using current conditions when including a state in a "covered jurisdiction"), with id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's judgment related to its power under the Fifteenth Amendment "warrants substantial deference"), and Stevens, supra note 25 (critiquing the decision in Shelby County).
second-generation voting barriers that harm African-American and Hispanic voters. These second-generation voting barriers developed despite federal supervision of state and local election procedures under the VRA; however, states in the covered jurisdictions did feel certain constraints, such as having to seek pre-clearance under Section 5 of the VRA when implementing voting procedure changes. This is now no longer the case. Shelby County, therefore, will unfortunately give state legislatures free rein to exploit and magnify the country’s racial divisions for political purposes. The Chief Justice’s decision will, in short, exacerbate the country’s problematic racial divisions to its overall detriment.

II. THE U.S. AND ITS RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS

The U.S. is the economic leader in the developed world, with a gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at over $16.7 trillion and a per capita income of approximately $52,800. The U.S. also retains, by far, the most powerful military in the world and is unique among industrialized countries in spending over 4% of its GDP on national defense. In addition, the U.S. maintains the world’s reserve currency, attracts highly skilled immigrants, and is home to the world’s leading universities and companies. The U.S., however, has many unique problems
compared to other industrialized and emerging nations. First, it has pronounced socio-economic and racial cleavages that are aggravated by the dynamics of the country’s political culture. Indeed, a recent Pew Research study demonstrates that median household wealth for Whites is 20- and 18-times greater than it is for Blacks and Hispanics, respectively. Evidence demonstrates that the U.S.’ inordinately high level of income inequality is a major reason it has struggled to recover economically from the 2008 financial crisis. The U.S.’ relative unwillingness to tax its citizens to pay for needed public investments and services, coupled with the fact it has a sizable portion of its population that, for historical reasons, has lower levels of human capital, education, and wealth than the White American majority, worsens this problem in a country that, according to the International Monetary Fund, was recently overtaken by the People’s Republic of China in terms of aggregate GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity. Pithily put, the U.S. taxes its citizens as though it was a developing nation and not the world’s leading industrialized country. Tax revenues account for a mere 17% of U.S.

53 Edward Luce, Tepid US Recovery – It's the Middle Class, Stupid, FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2014, 5:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/753899f0-e75b-11e3-88be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33ULLDY76.

Citizens of most industrial countries have demanded more public services as they have become richer. And they have been by and large willing
GDP (compared to 45.3% for Germany, 41.1% for the United Kingdom, and 37.7% for Canada). The U.S. has, accordingly, fewer resources to remediate poverty and income inequality rates that are the highest in the developed world, which, in turn, is related to racial polarization and inequality attributable to a history of discrimination against African-Americans, Hispanics, and other historically oppressed minority groups.59

Porter, supra note 54.


The U.S.’ inability to remediate problems of low economic growth rates, income inequality, and poor quality job creation is strongly related to infirmities in U.S. democracy. The U.S.’ bicameral system of government gives inordinate political power and resources to smaller, rural, and more racially homogeneous states compared to the larger states and urban areas where racial minorities are most preponderant.\(^{60}\) This asymmetry is magnified by the fact that the population discrepancy between large and small states has grown dramatically in recent years, and small state senators, who frequently hold leadership and chairperson positions in the Senate, are more prone to use the filibuster as a means of preventing a vote on proposed legislation.\(^{61}\) This inequality is exacerbated by the Court’s broad interpretation of First Amendment freedoms to invalidate campaign finance laws directed at limiting the influence of wealthy donors in American politics.\(^{62}\) It is also worsened by American federalism, which leads many states to enhance their competitiveness by cutting tax rates and slashing necessary public spending in areas such as education and public infrastructure.\(^{63}\)

Most importantly, the U.S.’ arcane election system relies on a single member plurality system to elect legislators and an obscure and complex system of voter registration, which depresses voter turnout to levels that are among the lowest in the developed world.\(^{64}\) Because low voter turnout rates correspond with income and racial minority status, especially in states with weak social safety nets, it is likely that the U.S.’ problems of income inequality and racial polarization are exacerbated by the fact that its poorer citizens are systematically excluded from the political

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61 Id.
system, which, in turn, moves the country’s political culture to the right.65 Daniel Weeks writes:

While income and education levels were not recorded in the survey, race and age were major factors influencing who made it to the polls on Election Day and what kind of barriers they faced. Black and Hispanic citizens, for whom the poverty rate is close to three times that of whites, were three times as likely as whites to not have the requisite I.D. and to have difficulty finding the correct polling place. They were more than three times as likely as whites to not receive a requested absentee ballot, and roughly twice as likely to be out of town on Election Day or to have to wait in long lines. They were also substantially more likely than whites to report transportation problems and bad time and location as reasons for not getting to the polls, while white voters were the most likely to cite disapproval of candidate choices. Taken together, the surveys suggest that white citizens who abstain from voting do so primarily by choice, while the majority of minority non-voters face problems along the way.66

In short, African-American and Hispanic voters are systematically excluded from polling places in a manner not experienced or imaginable by most Whites.67

The U.S. remains, by far, the world’s strongest economy by any measure. That said, the U.S. government is increasingly incapable of addressing its citizens’ needs for well-paying jobs, housing, health care, public infrastructure, social inclusion, social mobility, and an adequate safety net for poorer citizens.68

65 See Daniel Weeks, Why are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/. Weeks notes that the U.S. Census data demonstrates that only 47% of eligible voters with incomes less than $20,000 voted during the 2012 general election and just one in four voted during the 2010 mid-term elections. Id. This contrasts with rates of 80% and 60%, respectively, for those with incomes above $100,000. This gap broadens if one includes convicted felons and non-citizens. Id.

66 Id.

67 See id.

This inability is definitely related to pathologies in the U.S. democracy. As set forth more fully below, these infirmities are very difficult to remediate and are exacerbated by the U.S.' reliance on the single member plurality system to determine the winners of legislative elections.69 This—in conjunction with the fact that legislative district boundaries are drawn such that racial minorities who disproportionately vote in compact inner-city districts gerrymandered by state legislatures seeking partisan advantage—results in diluting the political effect of racial minority votes, making it less likely that the U.S. government will address the problems facing racial minority and poor citizens.70

A. Governmental Dysfunction

The U.S. is beset by a perceived dysfunction such that the political branches of U.S. government seem incapable of addressing the nation’s problems.71 In their book, It's Even Worse than it Looks, the highly regarded scholars Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein document how the U.S. Congressional system has broken down across partisan lines to make a bipartisan approach to legislation almost impossible.72 Evidence of this breakdown is apparent in the debt ceiling debacle73 that led Standard and Poor’s credit rating agency to downgrade the creditworthiness of U.S. government debt from AAA to AA+ in August 201174 and the inability of the House of Representatives to

69 See infra Part II.D.
70 See infra Part II.D.
find a bipartisan compromise to amend the nation’s immigration laws to integrate the nation’s illegal and undocumented immigrants.\textsuperscript{75} Further manifestations of U.S. government dysfunction include the Senate’s inability to pass a budget; its inability to confirm many of President Obama’s nominees to either the federal judiciary or bureaucracy; the political culture’s unwillingness to confront the country’s long term fiscal sustainability; problems facing individual Americans such as racially polarized and inadequate public education; the unsustainably high cost of post-secondary education; and the U.S. economy’s inability to produce a sufficient number of jobs that both pay a living wage and provide for social mobility.\textsuperscript{76}

B. Racial Political Polarization

The divisions between the two main political parties are worsened by the U.S.’ strong level of racial polarization in voting preferences, and this reinforces the U.S.’ historical racial and socio-economic cleavages. In contrast to the U.S. of 1965, where the VRA was enacted with strong bipartisan support,\textsuperscript{77} U.S. democratic legitimacy is questioned by the fact that the vast majority of the country’s racial minorities support only the Democratic Party at off-year, mid-term, and general elections—all of which


\textsuperscript{77} See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
are increasingly determined based on voters’ demographic profiles as opposed to the parties’ political platforms. By way of example, 95% of African-Americans voted for the Democratic Party’s Presidential candidate, Barack H. Obama, in the 2012 Presidential election, while 69% of White Protestants and 79% of White Christians voted for his challenger, former Governor Willard Mitt Romney. This polarization evidences how the U.S. has been incapable of remediating the divisions that prompted its Civil War: the Republican Party’s support base is the old solid South of former President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition, and the Democratic Party’s current base is comprised of the urban parts of the northeastern and west coast states that once formed the core of Republican Party support during the tenure of Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan.

Indeed, during the 2008 general election, Whites voted for President Obama in the former Confederate and segregationist states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana at parlous rates of 10%, 11%, and 14%, respectively. Sam Tanenhaus, explaining why the Republican Party is increasingly the party of White Americans, accurately described this transmogrification as changing from being the party of former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln to the party of former U.S. Vice-President and secessionist South Carolina U.S. Senator John C. Calhoun. This was not the case when Civil Rights legislation, such as the VRA, was first enacted in 1965 and passage was insured largely based

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82 Sam Tanenhaus, *Original Sin; Why the GOP is and Will Continue to be the Party of White People*, New Republic (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112365/why-republicans-are-party-white-people#.
on the support and cooperation of liberal Republicans from northeast, mid-west, and upper mid-western states such as Everett Dirksen, Charles Halleck, and Bill McCulloch.83 Today, Congressional Republicans—inordinately from the south and southwest—feel little incentive to remediate racial inequalities because their support base is less-educated Whites who are relatively hostile to racial minority interests. Meanwhile, racial minorities unquestioningly support the Democratic Party by a lopsided margin.84 This racial political polarization problem is further evidenced by the fact that President Obama was reelected by a decisive electoral-college margin of 332–206 and a majority of the popular vote, but won a meager 27% of the White, Southern vote and only 39% of the White vote nationwide.85

Because of its unhealthy correlation between race and political partisanship, the U.S. is unique in the developed world in its inability to develop sufficient social welfare programs for its poorer citizens.86 Crudely put, poor Whites disproportionately vote for the Republican Party, while racial minorities, regardless of income, overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic Party.87 This has led the Republican Party to view second-generation voting barriers, such as racial gerrymandering of election districts to dilute the political effect of racial minority votes and voter identification requirements that disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities, as key to its success.88

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84 See Brownstein, supra note 78.


87 See Brownstein, supra note 78.

C. Voter Identification Laws

The racial imbalance in political partisanship explains why Republican Party controlled legislatures have enacted voter identification laws that will effectively disenfranchise a disproportionate number of poor African-Americans, despite the complete absence of voter fraud nationwide.\(^89\) These laws generally require prospective voters not only to register to vote with a state board of election, but also to present state-issued identification such as a driver’s license prior to being allowed to vote.\(^90\) Studies show that racial minorities, for income and geographic reasons, are less likely to possess these pieces of identification.\(^91\)

Texas, by way of example, has seen its population expand dramatically due to a disproportionate increase in racial minority residents and the Texas economy’s stellar performance in job creation since the 2008 financial crises.\(^92\) It recently sought to enact a voter identification law that was enjoined from going into effect by the DDC since it would have imposed inordinate burdens on racial minority voters.\(^93\) Although the proposed Texas law required provision of free identification cards at Department of Public Safety (DPS) offices, the DDC found this an insufficient safeguard to minority voting because Texas has no DPS offices in 81 of the state’s 254 counties and the cheapest supporting


document needed to obtain the free identification, a birth certificate, costs $22.\textsuperscript{94} The DDC concluded the law “‘imposes strict, unforgiving burdens on the poor, and racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty.’”\textsuperscript{95}

Similarly stringent voter ID legislation signed into law by Republican Governor of North Carolina, Pat McCrory, will likely have the effect of depressing African-American voter turnout, and will therefore likely lower the number of Democratic voters at political primary, off-year, mid-term, and general elections.\textsuperscript{96} North Carolina’s law not only requires the presentation of government-issued voter identification at the polls, but substantially shortens early voting from seventeen to ten days and eliminates same-day voter registration, both of which are disproportionately relied upon by African-American voters.\textsuperscript{97}

Voter identification laws have been enacted in 34 states nationwide, of which 31 are in force, despite the complete absence of any evidence of voter fraud.\textsuperscript{98} In \textit{Crawford v. Marion County Election Board}, the Roberts Court analyzed the constitutionality of Indiana’s voter identification law.\textsuperscript{99} Despite the state’s complete lack of evidence of in-person voter fraud, the Court concluded that the Indiana voter identification law in question

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Id. (quoting Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 144 (D.D.C. 2012), \textit{vacated and remanded}, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013)).
  \item \textsuperscript{97} Id.; Denis McAllister, \textit{Fourth Circuit Blocks Parts of NC Election Law}, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 1, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/10/01/72012.htm.
  \item \textsuperscript{98} See Underhill, \textit{supra} note 90. As Andrew Cohen of the \textit{Denver Post} reported, Flummoxed by the lack of evidence of widespread voter fraud, frustrated at the push-back by civil libertarians and others who see the new generation of Republican voting-law tactics as discriminatory, conservative activists and their corporate sponsors around the country have moved on to the next best thing: calling out what they call “voter fraud deniers.” Andrew Cohen, \textit{Guest Commentary: Proving Voter Fraud is Elusive}, DENVER POST, (Sept. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21519784/proving-voter-fraud-is-elusive.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) (reviewing the constitutionality of an Indiana statute “requiring citizens voting in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at the office of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present photo identification issued by the government”).
\end{itemize}
served an important state interest in minimizing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence, and that the state’s interest outweighed the burden the law placed on the right to vote.\textsuperscript{100} Assessing the burdens the law imposed on Indiana voters, the Court noted that the Indiana voter identification law allowed for the provision of free identification to those who could establish their identity and residency for voting purposes.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, accommodations were available for indigent voters or those with religious objections.\textsuperscript{102}

In light of the burdens noted by the majority and the state interest at issue, the Court concluded:

\textit{In sum, on the basis of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes “excessively burdensome requirements” on any class of voters. A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep.” When we consider only the statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters we conclude that it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.”}\textsuperscript{103}

Accordingly, \textit{Crawford} requires that ballot access restrictions, such as voter ID laws, need only satisfy a balancing test between a state’s interest and the burden on voting rights.\textsuperscript{104} Justice Souter’s dissent, however, argued that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud and protecting confidence in the electoral system does not justify the burden that the voter ID law placed on voters.\textsuperscript{105} The burdens on franchise rights cited by Justice Souter include travel costs and fees necessary to obtain the required identification that would impose substantive barriers to poorer voters that cannot be justified by the state’s purported

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Id.} at 194–97, 202–04.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id.} at 186.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Id.} at 186 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Id.} at 202–03 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{104} See \textit{Crawford}, 553 U.S. at 189–90, 204.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id.} at 237 (Souter, J., dissenting).
objective in enacting the law—namely, voter fraud prevention, the modernization of election procedures, and engendering public trust in election procedures. Justice Souter concluded that, given the lack of legitimate evidence of voter fraud presented by the state, the law unjustifiably places an unconstitutional burden on voting rights, particularly as applied to old and poor voters.

Crawford’s holding provided broad leeway for states to implement voter identification laws. In view of the especially pronounced racial political polarization problem, Republican-controlled legislatures that were—before Shelby County—covered jurisdictions now have particular incentive to enact partisan voter ID laws to depress racial minority and, therefore, Democratic votes. By way of example, neither the DDC nor the AG would have precleared North Carolina’s recently enacted voter identification law in view of the law’s likely discriminatory impact on minority voters. The fact that preclearance is no longer required means that laws of this type might have dramatic political consequences in a country where states award the entirety of the Electoral College votes, for Presidential election purposes, to the candidate that wins the popular vote, regardless of the margin of victory. To illustrate, President Obama carried Virginia, Ohio, and Florida by very small margins—less than 1% and 3% of the popular vote in the 2012 Presidential election—between himself and former Governor Romney. It is plausible that the results would have been different had these states been able to introduce voter ID laws that are set to be fully implemented before the 2014 mid-term and the 2016 general

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106 Id. at 211–15, 225–35.
107 Id. at 236–37.
108 See id. at 204 (plurality opinion).
109 Blake, supra note 96.
D. Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution

Racial political polarization also explains why Republican-controlled legislatures have racially gerrymandered Congressional and state legislative districts to create majority-minority districts and thereby “dilute” the political effect of minority votes. The effect of partisan-motivated racial gerrymandering is clearly evidenced in numerous southern states that were previously VRA “covered jurisdictions.” In Virginia, the Republican Party won eight of the State’s eleven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact that President Obama carried the State by three percentage points. In North Carolina, Republicans carried eleven of the State’s thirteen House seats even though former Governor Romney carried the State by only two percentage points. In Georgia, Governor Romney defeated the incumbent President by a 53%–45% margin, but Republicans won nine of Georgia’s fourteen House seats. In Florida, President Obama won the state by nearly one full percentage point, but Republicans won seventeen of

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Florida’s twenty-seven House seats. In South Carolina, Romney carried the popular vote by a 54%–44% margin, but the Republican Party won a lopsided six of seven House seats; moreover, in a paradigmatic example of vote dilution, the sole Democratic winner, Congressman Jim Clyburn, carried his district with more than 94% of the popular vote. Similar patterns are found throughout the South and nationwide. For example, in Ohio, the President won the Buckeye State by nearly two percentage points in 2012, but the Republican Party won an overwhelming twelve of sixteen House seats. Indeed, the Republicans won 234 of the nation’s 435 house seats, notwithstanding the fact that Democrats received 1.6 million more votes nationwide.

The problem of racial gerrymandering should not be overstated. Vote-dilution of racial minority votes is an inherent aspect of American democracy because the country uses the single member plurality electoral system to elect legislators and not a proportional representation paradigm as used in Western Europe and New Zealand. This, in conjunction with the fact

125 “Under the plurality system, the candidate with the most votes in a single election round wins, regardless of whether that candidate receives an absolute majority of votes.” Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas A. Rietz, Majority Requirements and Minority Representation, 63 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 691, 691 (2008).
126 “Proportional representation is a system in which seats in representative bodies are awarded to parties in proportion to the votes they receive in the election, sometimes subject to some minimum vote requirement.” Id. at 691 n.2.
that African-Americans and Hispanics disproportionately live in geographically compact inner cities\textsuperscript{129} means that, absent adoption of a proportional representation paradigm, racial minority vote-dilution will be an inherent aspect of American democracy so long as racial imbalances continue in American living patterns. That said, racial political polarization has, for historical reasons, been systematically more pronounced in what were the VRA Section 4 covered jurisdictions\textsuperscript{130} and the VRA Section 5 preclearance procedures at least provided some safeguard against partisan legislative excess.\textsuperscript{131} The issue of racially motivated partisan gerrymandering and voter identification laws, however, was disregarded by the Roberts Court in \textit{Shelby County}.

III. VRA PROVISIONS, SECOND GENERATION VOTING BARRIERS, AND THE COURT’S FLAWED ANALYSIS

A. VRA Section 2 and its Inconsistency with the Fourteenth Amendment

VRA Section 2 was amended in 1982 to deal with the proliferation of at-large voting districts that were instituted by previously segregationist states to minimize the likelihood of racial minorities being elected to office.\textsuperscript{132} The logic is as follows. Suppose a city has five members that are elected to the state legislature. Assume further that 40\% of the city’s population is Black and there is pronounced racial imbalance in living patterns and political preferences such that if typical single-member plurality districts were used, White voters would be able to elect three of...
the five candidates, while Blacks would be able to elect two candidates. If, on the other hand, at-large districts were in place, such that if each voter chooses five candidates, it can be expected the city would elect 5 White candidates, presumably by a 60–40% majority. VRA Section 2 was amended to protect against this problem.\(^\text{133}\) It prohibits any voting change or practice, including redistricting plans, applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision, which results in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race, color, or linguistic minority status.\(^\text{134}\) The law provides that a violation is established if it is shown, by a totality of the circumstances, that elections are not a viable means for sufficiently preponderant minorities to elect the candidates of their choice.\(^\text{135}\) This was, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, interpreted to require states to create or maintain majority-minority voting districts, because this facilitates the process of enabling racial minorities to elect racial minority candidates as their representatives.\(^\text{136}\)

Although VRA Section 2 was amended in 1982 to remediate at-large election schemes that had the effect of preventing racial minorities from electing the candidates of their choice,\(^\text{137}\) federally mandated majority-minority districts dilute the statewide political effect of racial minority votes. This is because VRA Section 2, as interpreted, creates a manifest tension between assisting racial minorities in electing racial minority candidates and the associated state-wide vote dilution of racial minority votes.\(^\text{138}\)

\(^{133}\) See Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1556.


\(^{135}\) Id. (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012)).


\(^{137}\) S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 5–6 (1982); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (stating that the “essence of a Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives”).

\(^{138}\) See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (noting the inherent conflict between Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County v. Holder: Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Conflicts With Section 2, Which Provides the Proper Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Voting, SCOTUSBLOG,
This tension was evidenced in *Easley v. Cromartie*, where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of North Carolina’s 12th Congressional District—created at the behest of former President George H. W. Bush’s Justice Department to provide a second majority-minority district for African-American voters—because the Court found that the Legislature’s purpose in forming the district was political rather than racial. The key background fact in *Easley* is that racial political polarization led North Carolina’s then-Democratic legislature to initially create only one majority-African-American Congressional district so as to minimize vote-dilution of African-American Democratic votes statewide. This, however, came into conflict with the Justice Department’s interpretation of Section 5, which required the creation of a second majority-minority and therefore a second safe Democratic Congressional district, perhaps to facilitate Republican interests statewide and in Congress, because transferring African-American voters into a majority-minority district translates into fewer African-Americans voting in adjacent districts.

Although VRA Section 2 represented a laudable attempt to enable African-Americans to elect their chosen candidates, it has unfortunately resulted in statewide vote dilution of racial minority votes and is premised on the constitutionally dubious supposition that requiring states to racially gerrymander voting districts to facilitate the election of racial minority candidates is the


140 *Id.* at 258; see also Richard L. Hasen, *Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere*, 127 HARV. L. REV. 58, 68–69 (2014) (discussing the role of George H. W. Bush’s Justice Department in creating of a second majority-minority district).

141 Hasen, *supra* note 140, at 67–68. See generally *Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. at 480 (majority opinion) (“In order to maximize the electoral success of a minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of ‘safe’ districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice.”).

142 *Id.* at 68; cf. *Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (noting that “considerations of race that would doom a redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 5”).
best means of protecting racial minority political interests.\textsuperscript{143} Indeed, although racist Dixiecrats opposed racial minorities from being elected to office when VRA Section 2 was amended in 1982, conservative and populist Republicans today are all too willing to facilitate the creation of majority-minority legislative districts because it facilitates Republican Party interests both statewide and in Congress.\textsuperscript{144} In effect, Republican-controlled legislatures have cooperated with racial minority candidates to abuse VRA Section 2 and racially gerrymander Congressional and state legislative districts to create majority-minority districts and “dilute” the political effect of minority votes.\textsuperscript{145}

VRA Section 2 was amended to largely remedy the problem of at-large voting districts that appeared in the South to insure against the election of racial minority candidates.\textsuperscript{146} After at-


\textsuperscript{144} See Ari Berman, How the GOP Is Resegregating the South, NATION (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/165976/how-gop-resegregating-south# ("In virtually every state in the South, at the Congressional and state level, Republicans—to protect and expand their gains in 2010—have increased the number of minority voters in majority-minority districts represented overwhelmingly by black Democrats while diluting the minority vote in swing or crossover districts held by white Democrats.").


Republicans in control of redistricting have two goals: the defeat of white Democrats, and the creation of safe districts for Republicans. They have achieved both of these goals by increasing the number of districts likely to elect an African-American. Black voters are gerrymandered out of districts represented by whites of both parties, making the Democratic incumbent weaker and the Republican incumbent stronger. . . . [T]he Republican takeover of state legislatures has left black and Hispanic citizens without effective representation—representation that can come only from the majority party. The racialization of the two parties, most noticeable in the South, will work to keep minority Americans at the margins of power, hindered from shaping the policies that determine social and economic mobility and the overall quality of life.

Edsall, supra note 143 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{146} S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5–6 (1982).
large voting districts were discontinued, VRA Section 2 was interpreted to require states to create legislative districts that would most likely, based on their demographic profile, elect racial minority candidates to office.\footnote{See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55–58, 63–64 (1986) (discussing Congress’s intent in amending Section 2 and applying Congress’s intent to the facts of the case).} Although this has resulted in a relatively high number of African-American elected officials in Congress and nationwide, it has often, because of vote-dilution, resulted in fewer Democrats being elected statewide, fewer committee chairmanships, and therefore less racial minority political power nationwide.\footnote{See Juliet Eilperin, What’s Changed For African Americans Since 1963, By the Numbers, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2013/08/22/whats-changed-for-african-americans-since-1963-by-the-numbers/; Ed Kilgore, African-Americans and Statewide Offices, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 16, 2012 12:50 PM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2012_03/africanamericans_and_statewide036104.php; see also Edsall, supra note 143 (“African-American Democratic officials—according to data compiled from academic research and the Web sites of state legislatures—have been relegated to minority party status. Equally important, an estimated 86 African-Americans who spent years accumulating seniority have lost their chairmanships of state legislative committees to white Republicans.”).} This belies the VRA’s goal of advancing and protecting racial minority interests.\footnote{The highly regarded African-American columnist Cynthia Tucker further supports the assertion that the proliferation of majority-minority districts has in fact harmed African-Americans nationwide:} 149 The fact that Shelby County invalidated VRA Section 4, but left VRA Section 2 intact, represents the worst scenario for racial minority voters because VRA Sections 4 and 5 had been used to place a check on racial gerrymandering of the type incentivized by Section 2.\footnote{See Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 77 (2014).}
This issue was completely disregarded by the Chief Justice in *Shelby County*.  

B. The “Bail-In” Procedures Under VRA Section 3

The “bail-in” provision of VRA Section 3 allows the AG to commence a suit seeking a federal court order adjudicating a voting jurisdiction to have violated voting rights. Should the federal court adjudicate the lawsuit in the AG’s favor, it retains jurisdiction to supervise the jurisdiction’s voting procedures until all issues of racial voting discrimination have ended. *Shelby County* did nothing to affect the “bail-in” procedure outlined in VRA Section 3, which remains fully intact. Although conservatives might argue this provides ample grounds to police racial discrimination in voting, this must be contextualized because “bailing in” jurisdictions is an extremely expensive and time-consuming process that is almost impossible for the AG to police in a continent-sized country with some 4,678 voting jurisdictions. While the “bail-in” provision authorizes federal courts to impose clearance requirements on jurisdictions that have been adjudicated to have violated either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments with respect to voting rights, this is burdensome, expensive, time-consuming, and extremely difficult to prove. It applies to all jurisdictions in the following ways:

1. It allows the AG to petition a federal court to seek injunctive relief to prevent a voting jurisdiction from enacting changes to voting procedures, such as literacy tests, intimidation, threats, or coercion that allegedly discriminate against potential minority voters.

2. It requires federal courts to order the Director of the

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153 Id.
154 See *Shelby Cnty*, 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (holding Section 4 of the VRA unconstitutional but making no determination as to the constitutionality of Section 3).
156 See Crum, supra note 32, at 2033.
Office of Personnel Management to send federal observers to in-
sure against local voting procedures that would violate either the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.\textsuperscript{158}

3. Upon a federal court finding of intentional discrimina-
tion and discriminatory effect, the court may issue an order enti-
tling the affected individuals to exercise their voting rights.\textsuperscript{159}

4. The AG may then petition the district court to convene
a three-judge district court panel, in the venue where the alleged
voting infringement took place, to determine the entire case al-
leging voter discrimination by local officials.\textsuperscript{160}

5. Upon a finding by the three-judge panel that intentional
discrimination against voting rights has occurred, the lower fed-
eral court shall retain jurisdiction over the offending jurisdic-
tion’s voting procedures until it is satisfied that any discrimina-
tory voting issues have been resolved or until the AG has
approved the voting changes at issue.\textsuperscript{161}

As outlined above, the VRA “bail-in” provision limits any ju-
risdiction’s ability to conduct its elections if, at the AG’s behest,
a three-judge federal district court panel finds the jurisdiction
has intentionally violated voting rights based on race, national
origin or color. The “bailed in” jurisdiction must subsequently
have either the same three-judge federal court panel or the AG
approve its election procedures before such voting procedures
can go into effect.\textsuperscript{162}

Attorney General Eric Holder commenced “bail-in” pro-
cedings against Texas based on its redistricting plan that a fed-
eral court found to have diluted the political effect of Black and

\textsuperscript{158} Id. (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2012)).

\textsuperscript{159} See id. (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2012)); see also Jeffers v. Clinton, 749 F. Supp. 585, 586–87 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Crum, supra note 32, at 2006;
Paul M. Wiley, Shelby and Section 3: Pulling the Voting Rights Act’s Pocket Trigger to
Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County v. Holder, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2115,
113th Cong. (2014) (proposing to bring any violation of voting rights, whether
intentional or not, within the scope of Section 3, except for voter identification
laws).

\textsuperscript{160} See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3(c), 79 Stat. 437 (codified

\textsuperscript{161} See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3(c), 79 Stat. 437 (codified

\textsuperscript{162} See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3(c), 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2012)).
Hispanic votes. This is because Section 3 is only available to “bail-in” a jurisdiction if a court has already determined the jurisdiction intentionally discriminated on the basis of race or ethnicity in its proposed voting change or redistricting plan. The fact that Section 3 requires both a prior challenge to the voting change and a subsequent court action to “bail-in” the offending jurisdiction, makes it very expensive and will result in many “sub-threshold” discriminatory voting changes going unchallenged. This is evidenced by the paucity of “bail-in” cases that have resulted in a change to proposed redistricting plans and the Congressional findings that preclearance is necessitated by the inadequacy of “bail-in” case-by-case suits “because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in [such] lawsuits.”

The obvious problem with this paradigm for enforcing voting rights is the difficulty in proving intentional discrimination and the expense and time-consuming nature of the litigation. Perhaps more fundamentally, the AG is capable of policing only the most egregious voting rights violations in a continent-sized country with nearly five thousand voting jurisdictions.

C. The Importance of VRA Section 4 and the Harmful Consequence of its Invalidation

The potentially abusive aspect of VRA Section 2 and the overall ineffectiveness of VRA Section 3 explains why *Shelby*...
County is so harmful: it invalidated VRA Section 4’s coverage formula and effectively nullifies federal preclearance enforcement of minority voting rights.\footnote{See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.} VRA Section 5 required “covered jurisdictions” that Congress determined had demonstrated a historical pattern and practice of denying African-American and other racial minorities the right to vote to submit all proposed voting procedure changes to either a three-judge panel of the DDC or the AG for “prec clearance” before voting procedure changes could go into effect.\footnote{See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012)); Crum, supra note 32, at 1999.} “Under VRA Section 4(b), a state or political entity is a ‘covered jurisdiction’ if, during the 1964, 1968 or 1972 presidential election, it 1) maintained an illegal ‘test or device,’ such as, among other things, a literacy test, and 2) had voter turnout below fifty percent.”\footnote{Crum, supra note 32, at 1999 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012))).} “Enacted in 1965 as a temporary provision, Section 5 has been reauthorized four times: in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006.”\footnote{Crum, supra note 32, at 2000.} Although the coverage formula and bailout process have changed since 1965, the structure of the original Act, until Shelby County, remained intact.\footnote{Id. at 1999.} The covered jurisdictions included the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia; counties in California, Florida, New York, North Carolina and South Dakota; and townships in the states of Michigan and New Hampshire.\footnote{Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited July 30, 2014).} These covered jurisdictions needed to obtain pre-approval from either the AG or the DDC before any changes to voting procedures could be finalized and implemented.\footnote{Id. at 1999 n.26 (citing 28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (2009)); Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited July 30, 2014).} In effect, the VRA’s preclearance provision required them to demonstrate that even minor voting changes had neither the purpose nor effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, and, in some circumstances, heritage or language.\footnote{See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012)).}
In *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*\(^{175}\) the Warren Court that concluded the preclearance requirements of VRA Section 5 to be constitutionally valid: “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”\(^{176}\) The Court further concluded that Congress’s coverage formula was proper because Congress had evidence of actual voting discrimination in the vast majority of covered jurisdictions and “was therefore entitled to infer a significant danger of the evil in the few remaining States and political subdivisions covered by . . . the Act.”\(^{177}\)

VRA Section 4(b)’s invalidation, however, was adumbrated in *City of Boerne v. Flores*,\(^{178}\) wherein the Rehnquist Court invalidated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to the states because the Congressional power used to pass remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment was valid only where manifestly congruent and proportional to a constitutional wrong committed by a state.\(^{179}\) Because the legislative authorizations in both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments provide that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,”\(^{180}\) it was clear that limits on Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to pass only remedial legislation should also apply to legislation enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment, such as the VRA.\(^{181}\) This explains the rationale behind Shelby County’s legal challenge to VRA Section 4(b)—namely, the claim based on *City of Boerne* that the coverage formula, which might have been remedial, congruent, and proportional when the VRA was first enacted in 1965, could no longer be characterized as such because racial minority voter registration levels and ballot access had so markedly improved in the intervening years. Indeed, during oral argument in *Shelby County*, the Chief Justice confronted Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli with the assertion

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176 Id. at 324.
177 Id. at 329; Crum, *supra* note 32, at 2001.
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
181 See *City of Boerne*, 521 U.S. at 516–18.
that Mississippi, a covered jurisdiction under VRA Section 4, had the highest ratio of Black voter turnout compared to White voter turnout, while Massachusetts had the lowest.\textsuperscript{182} Problematically for the Chief Justice’s perspective, this is most likely because the House and Senate reports reauthorizing the VRA treat Hispanic voters as White; this artificially lowers the White voter turnout rate, because a disproportionately high rate of Hispanics are non-citizens and therefore ineligible to register as voters, and Massachusetts has a higher proportion of resident non-citizens compared to Mississippi.\textsuperscript{183}

The Chief Justice’s analysis, accordingly, focused on perceived differences between the voting discrimination of the past and today:

In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.\textsuperscript{184}

The Chief Justice’s claim that the nation is no longer divided along voting lines, however, is contradicted by the obvious racial polarization in U.S. voting patterns and the use of second-generation voting barriers to limit racial minority ballot access and dilute the effect of racial minority votes.\textsuperscript{185} Although this polarization is found nationwide, it is especially pronounced in the previously covered jurisdictions, which, as a result, have become the Republican Party’s base.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[183] Persily, supra note 9, at 197–98.
\item[184] Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013). The Chief Justice described the criteria justifying use of the coverage formula as “evidence of actual voting discrimination”’ [which] shared two characteristics: ‘the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national average.”’ Id. at 2625 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 330 (1966)).
\item[185] See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 89, at 206; NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE ET AL., DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: CONFRONTING MODERN BARRIERS TO VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 6 (2011).
\item[186] See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 89, at 206.
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omitted by the Chief Justice.\textsuperscript{187}

In addition to ignoring racial polarization and increasing attacks on minority ballot access, the Chief Justice’s opinion represents what some scholars would call “the most dramatic exercise of judicial review over federal law since the Lochner era.”\textsuperscript{188} Former Justice John Paul Stevens, criticizing \textit{Shelby County}, focused on the Court’s institutional illegitimacy to invalidate the VRA’s coverage formula over the wisdom of legislation adopted by Congress, based on its broad powers to enact legislation under the Fifteenth Amendment, which cannot be questioned by the federal government’s unelected branch.\textsuperscript{189} He writes:

The several congressional decisions to preserve the preclearance requirement—including its 2006 decision—were preceded by thorough evidentiary hearings that have consistently disclosed more voting violations in those states than in other parts\textsuperscript{187} in a recent Harvard Law Review essay on the continued relevance of the VRA’s coverage formula, Professors Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart III focus on the particularly high rate of racial political polarization in the former covered jurisdictions, stating:

Voting in the covered jurisdictions has become even more polarized over the last four years, as the gap between whites and racial minorities has continued to grow. This is due both to a decline among whites and an increase among minorities in supporting President Obama’s reelection. This gap is not the result of mere partisanship, for even when controlling for partisan identification, race is a statistically significant predictor of vote choice, especially in the covered jurisdictions. . . . . To be sure, the coverage formula does not capture every racially polarized jurisdiction, nor does every county covered by section 5 outrank every noncovered county on this score. However, the stark race-based differences in voting patterns between the covered and noncovered jurisdictions taken as a whole demonstrate the coverage formula’s continuing relevance.

\textit{Id.} at 206, 220.

\textsuperscript{188} Persily, \textit{supra} note 9, at 252. Persily, predicting in his 2007 Yale Law Journal article that the VRA would not be overturned, stated:

The VRA remains the gold standard for exercises of congressional power to enforce civil rights. . . . Were the Court to strike down the new VRA as exceeding congressional power (even based on the eminently reasonable arguments as to why Congress has overstepped its bounds) it would be exercising its muscle of judicial review to an unprecedented extent. Perhaps this is why even Justice Scalia has suggested that he would allow stare decisis to apply to congressional actions under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that concern race and has recognized compliance with the VRA as a compelling state interest.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{189} See Stevens, \textit{supra} note 25.
of the country. Those decisions have had the support of strong majority votes by members of both major political parties. Not only is Congress better able to evaluate the issue than the Court, but it is also the branch of government designated by the Fifteenth Amendment to make decisions of this kind.190

Following Shelby County, state legislatures, no longer encumbered by preclearance requirements, will have free reign to impose “second generation” barriers to minority voting power, with the help of VRA Section 2.191 Although the Chief Justice’s opinion states that these problems were never meant to be remediated by the Act’s preclearance provisions,192 this is belied by the fact that preclearance was most frequently used by the Justice Department to remediate vote-dilution and not ballot access. In support of this thesis, Professor Daniel Tokaji writes:

While Shelby County has prompted some state legislators and election officials to seek new restrictions on voting, it does not follow that the preclearance regime was an effective weapon against voting discrimination in election administration. This paradox arises from the disjunction between perception and reality when it comes to preclearance before Shelby County. . . . Section 5 was much more effective with respect to vote dilution than vote denial. The statute was mostly used to block practices believed to weaken the strength of racial minorities’ votes, not those that prevent people from voting or having their votes counted. Put another way, Section 5 was mostly a tool for promoting equal representation rather than equal participation.195

Further, Congress, after an extensive inquiry into the continued need for the VRA in 2006, found precisely that which the Chief Justice denied: that “second-generation barriers to minority voting” such as racial gerrymandering and at-large voting systems required continued federal oversight under the VRA.194

190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
192 Id. at 2629.
193 See Tokaji, supra note 150, at 77 (emphasis added). Tokaji’s analysis showed that “the percentage of Redistricting changes yielding an objection (.94%) was over three and one-half times that of the next highest category, again Method of Election (.26%). . . . Vote dilution, and specifically redistricting and at-large elections, were much more likely to trigger a response from DOJ.” Id. at 78, 80.
194 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2634–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted in detail:

After considering the full legislative record, Congress made the following findings: The VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating
The Chief Justice’s position that the VRA’s preclearance provisions have nothing to do with second-generation voting barriers, such as stringent voter identification laws and minority vote-dilution, is further contradicted by the Roberts Court’s decision in *Perry v. Perez*.\(^{195}\) *Perry* involved a lawsuit brought by various plaintiffs alleging that Texas’ redistricting plans discriminated against Latinos and African-Americans and intended to dilute their voting strength.\(^{196}\) In a *per curiam* opinion, the *Perry* Court concluded that where a VRA-covered jurisdiction’s proposed redistricting plan could not be pre-cleared by either the AG or the DDC in time for a forthcoming election, and was borne of a massive population change that renders reliance on its previous district map infeasible, the district court adjudicating the legality of the challenged redistricting plan “should take guidance” from the legally challenged plan in “drafting an interim plan” because the challenged plan “reflects the State’s policy judgments on where to place new districts and how to shift existing ones in response to massive population growth.”\(^{197}\) *Perry*, applying the VRA’s preclearance provisions to prevent minority-vote dilution, rebuts the Chief Justice’s assertion that the VRA’s preclearance provision has nothing to do with minority vote-dilution.

The Chief Justice’s focus on ostensible changes in voting patterns to conclude the VRA’s coverage formula is outdated and therefore unconstitutional is problematic for two reasons. First, it completely disregards second-generation voting barriers that first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked increase in minority voter registration and turnout and the number of minority elected officials. But despite this progress, “second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process” continued to exist, as well as racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which increased the political vulnerability of racial and language minorities in those jurisdictions. Extensive “[e]vidence of continued discrimination,” Congress concluded, “clearly show[ed] the continued need for Federal oversight” in covered jurisdictions.


\(^{196}\) *Id.* at 940. “Latinos and African-Americans accounted for three-quarters of Texas’ population growth since 2000.” *Id.*

\(^{197}\) *Id.* at 941.
Congress specifically cited when it reenacted the coverage formula. Second, it is an overly aggressive and unnecessarily intrusive use of judicial review that takes too narrow a view of Congressional legislative power under the Reconstruction Amendments, both because the VRA’s most recent reauthorization was set to expire in 2031, and because covered jurisdictions retained their entitlement to “bail out” from preclearance requirements under very favorable terms.

D. VRA Bailout

Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Chief Justice’s decision is its failure to acknowledge that “covered jurisdictions” always retained the ability to “bail out” from the coverage formula under very favorable terms. Indeed, far from the Chief Justice’s claim that “covered jurisdictions” were forced to suffer an irrevocable and permanent handicap that deprived them of equal treatment in a federal system of government, the VRA’s coverage formula, in conjunction with the bailout provision, provided the proper incentive to covered jurisdictions to accommodate the electoral needs of their racial and ethnic minorities, and thereby end federal supervision of their election procedures in a manner that is straightforward, easy, and cost-effective. The VRA bailout provision enabled jurisdictions to forego the VRA’s preclearance requirements if they could prove “that any tests or other devices they had used as a prerequisite to registering to vote had not been used with the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race or color.” According to J. Gerald Herbert, the bailout provisions are “tailored in such a way as to require covered jurisdictions to prove nondiscrimination in voting on the very issues that Congress intended to target when it enacted the special remedial provisions in the first place.”

200 Id. at 257.
201 Id. at 258.
that the act remains consistent with sound principles of federalism.\textsuperscript{202}

Until \textit{Shelby County}, covered jurisdictions seeking a bailout had to demonstrate both a ten-year record of nondiscriminatory voting practices and current efforts to expand minority participation in all aspects of the political process.\textsuperscript{203} This required them to demonstrate that in the previous ten years:

1. No test or device has been used to determine voter eligibility with the purpose or effect of discrimination;
2. No final judgments, consent decrees, or settlements have been entered against the jurisdiction for racially discriminatory voting practices;
3. No federal examiners have been assigned to monitor elections;
4. There has been timely preclearance submission of all voting changes and full compliance with Section 5; and
5. There have been no objections by either the AG or the DDC.\textsuperscript{204}

6. Jurisdictions seeking a bailout also had to address first- and second-generation voting barriers before being bailed out; that is, they had the burden of proving nondiscrimination in all aspects of their voting and electoral processes. This burden included a showing that, at the time the bailout is sought:
7. Any dilutive voting or election procedures have been eliminated;
8. Constructive efforts have been made to eliminate any known harassment of intimidation of voters;
9. They have engaged in other constructive efforts at increasing minority voter participation such as expanding opportunities for convenient registration and voting, and appointing minority election officials throughout all stages of the registration/election process.\textsuperscript{205}
10. They have not violated “any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State or political subdivision with respect to discrimination in voting on account of race

\textsuperscript{202} Id.
\textsuperscript{203} Id. at 262.
\textsuperscript{204} Id. at 262–63.
\textsuperscript{205} Herbert, \textit{supra} note 299, at 263.
or color” in the past ten years.\textsuperscript{206} The purpose behind the bailout formula was to achieve the VRA’s goals.\textsuperscript{207} In effect, the bailout option gave “covered jurisdictions” the incentive to “move beyond the status quo and improve accessibility to the entire electoral process for racial and ethnic minorities.”\textsuperscript{208} The ease of this process is evidenced by the numbers; for example, between 1982 and Shelby County, the Justice Department approved all 12 applications for bailout.\textsuperscript{209}

The fact “covered jurisdictions” can effectively “bail out” from the VRA’s preclearance requirements on favorable terms effectively rebuts the Chief Justice’s assertion that the VRA’s coverage formula permanently treats covered jurisdictions as irrevocably unequal.\textsuperscript{210} Indeed, the fact that so many of them failed to do so\textsuperscript{211} should have given the Court pause before invalidating the VRA’s coverage formula on the premise that it is no longer congruent and proportional under its parsimonious interpretation of Congressional legislative power under the Reconstruction Amendments.\textsuperscript{212}

\textbf{IV. Shelby County and its Policy Consequences}

The Chief Justice invalidated the Act’s preclearance provision based on a conservative and federalist jurisprudence that limits Congressional power in favor of greater state autonomy to conduct election procedures.\textsuperscript{213} This is the traditional conservative view of federalism as a source individual empowerment based on the several States competing for the affection of citizens and businesses. This conservative and federalist view is contrasted by Justice Ginsburg’s liberal jurisprudence that favors both deference to Congressional statutes and a prominent role for the federal government in protecting racial minorities and other vulnerable individuals from historically oppressive state

\textsuperscript{207} Id. at 266.
\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{209} Id. at 270.
\textsuperscript{210} See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013); Hebert, supra note 204, at 258.
\textsuperscript{211} See Hebert, supra note 204, at 271.
\textsuperscript{212} See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–30.
\textsuperscript{213} See id.
legislatures. Although the Chief Justice’s jurisprudence resonates powerfully in the political culture, which remains both conservative and individualistic, its weakness is evidenced by a naïve indifference to the country’s continued difficulty in having underrepresented minorities participate in the political process on equal terms. By way of example, his decision makes no reference whatever to racial polarization in voting patterns, when this is among the most obvious pathologies of U.S. democracy. Furthermore, his disregard of problems such as racially-based gerrymandering to dilute the political effect of minority votes gives short shrift to the most obvious problem facing minority voters in states with a history of discrimination that suffer from racial polarization in all aspects of civic life. Evidence of this pathology is demonstrated not only by the manifest racial tensions exacerbated by the racial composition of government officials in Ferguson, Missouri, but also by the fact that U.S. political culture has seized on exit polls to show that Hispanics voted for President Obama over former Governor Romney by a margin of 71–29%, demonstrating a compelling need for bipartisan “immigration reform.”214 This same political culture, however, has been completely silent about the fact that the President won an absurdly high 95% of the African-American vote in the 2008 election, while only 10%, 11%, and 14% of Whites voted for the President in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, respectively.215 The Chief Justice also completely failed to acknowledge that covered jurisdictions that objected to their status as such had free opportunity to seek bailout under very favorable terms.

Disregarding these issues, the Chief Justice’s decision in Shelby County sweepingly invalidates the key provision of the most important piece of voting rights legislation ever enacted by U.S. Congress. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent describes the Chief Justice’s decision to invalidate preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work as “throwing away your umbrella in a


Further, the Court lacked institutional competence to strike the Act’s coverage formula. Former Justice Stevens criticized that

[the Chief Justice’s] opinion fails, however, to explain why such a decision should be made by the members of the Supreme Court. The members of Congress, representing the millions of voters who elected them, are far more likely to evaluate correctly the risk that the interest in maintaining the supremacy of the white race still plays a significant role in the politics of those states. After all, that interest was responsible for creating the slave bonus when the Constitution was framed, and in motivating the violent behavior that denied blacks access to the polls in those states for decades prior to the enactment of the VRA.

The result of this “judicial activism” is that State legislators nationwide will be given free rein to reinforce the nation’s racial divisions for parochial partisan purposes. The highly regarded liberal Washington Post columnist E. J. Dionne explained:

The Shelby County ruling will make it far more difficult for African Americans to challenge unfair electoral and districting practices. For many states, it will be a Magna Carta to make voting more difficult if they wish to.

In less-diplomatic language, existing majorities may try to fix election laws to make it far more difficult for their opponents to toss them from power in later elections. Republican legislatures around the country have passed a spate of voter suppression laws disguised as efforts to guarantee electoral “integrity” for just this purpose.

Accordingly, the Shelby County decision effectively guts the VRA by leaving intact only the nationwide “bail-in” mechanism that is both expensive, time-consuming, and an altogether insufficient safeguard for protecting minority voting rights, as well as

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216 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
VRA Section 2, which, as set forth above, has, if anything, exacerbated the problem of racial vote-dilution.\textsuperscript{219}

Although after \textit{Shelby County} Congress can reauthorize VRA Section 4(b) under a new coverage formula,\textsuperscript{220} this would require both Congressional Houses to agree on the composition of states and jurisdictions that would be included under the formula. This is implausible, both in view of the level of political partisanship, racial political polarization, and divided government that characterizes American politics today.\textsuperscript{221} Indeed, the Court’s decision will embolden Southern Republican opposition to any reauthorization because opposition to the VRA has been both legitimized and politicized by the Court and because any reauthorization will inordinately affect Southern Republicans, as they are the base of their party, which, for partisan reasons, has a pronounced incentive to both minimize and dilute the political effect of racial minority votes.

The most likely political effect of \textit{Shelby County} is that states and other jurisdictions will further implement problematic second-generation voting barriers to minority voting and thereby reinforce the historical racial cleavages that bedevil U.S. society. As previously mentioned, the Republican-controlled legislature and the Republican Governor of North Carolina recently enacted a stringent voter identification law that will have the effect of depressing African-American voter turnout, which, because of the state’s unhealthy correlation between race and political partisanship, will lower the number of Democratic voters.\textsuperscript{222} Therefore, this voter ID law will most likely exacerbate the existing high levels of racial polarization in North Carolina politics to the detriment of both its government and people. This is a problematic result for the Chief Justice because, but for his decision, North Carolina would most likely have never proposed such a draconian law and, if it did, neither the AG nor the DDC would likely have authorized the proposal.\textsuperscript{223} For the sake of both the

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{See Shelby Cnty.}, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.


\textsuperscript{221} \textit{See supra} note 72 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{See supra} notes 96–97 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{223} \textit{See supra} notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
country and the Court, one hopes North Carolina is not a paradigmatic example.

The importance of preclearance should not be overstated—at the time the VRA was reauthorized, AG objection to preclearance requests decreased from over 4% in the first five years after the VRA was first enacted, to between .05% and 0.23% from 1983–2002, with an annual objection rate since the mid-1990s of less than 0.2%. Moreover, second-generation voting barriers to racial minority voters are inherent in the country’s single member plurality system of awarding legislative seats. The use of single member plurality districts, in conjunction with the country’s racial imbalance in living patterns, accounts for much of the country’s racial minority vote-dilution because racial minorities tend to live in compact urban inner cities, while Whites disproportionately live in suburbs and rural communities.

This, however, should be contextualized by the fact that the preclearance regime was plausibly a necessary, but insufficient, means of protecting racial minority voters in a racially polarized climate. This is demonstrated by the fact that the AG, since 1982, sent over 800 requests for more information regarding proposed voting changes, which led voting jurisdictions to withdraw potentially discriminatory submissions in 205 instances and alter proposed voting procedure changes in many others.

To paraphrase the Russian philosopher Nikolai Chernyshevsky, what is to be done? How do we insure maximal racial minority participation in our politics without engendering a backlash against minority rights? One option is for states to take redistricting away from state legislatures and leave it in the hands of a bipartisan group of experts, which is what California does. However, this solution will still result in racial minority vote dilution, albeit to a lesser degree, because of racial imbalance in living patterns. Ideally, the political culture will change

224 Persily, supra note 9, at 190.
226 Persily, supra note 9, at 200.
and there will cease to be so strong a correlation between race and political partisanship, such that the incentive to use second-generation voting barriers will disappear. This is very unlikely to materialize in the near future because the wealth and income gap between African-Americans and Whites remains enormous, with Whites collectively owning 88.4% of the country’s wealth, while African-Americans collectively own a paltry 2.7%. 228 Moreover, it is implausible that substantial numbers of African-Americans will support the Republican Party, a political party espousing tax cuts and expenditures that, if anything, will exacerbate this inequality.

There is, however, the option of replacing single member plurality districts with a form of modified proportional representation, as used in Western European countries. 229 Though this might seem far-fetched, most Americans disapprove of Congress, which currently has an abysmal approval level. 230 There would be no need for any constitutional amendment to make such a change, as this can be accomplished at the state level. 231 The benefits of such a reform are obvious—namely, the end of vote-dilution altogether and increased voter participation because every voter will perceive their vote to have political implications. 232 Further advantages include the election of more women to office and government policies that are more aligned with those of median voters. 233 It is perhaps no coincidence that the countries that have instituted some form of proportional representation have done the best job at serving their citizens’ needs


229 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.


231 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”)


in terms of balanced and sustainable economic growth, while providing a safety net for poorer citizens and minimizing regionalism.\textsuperscript{234} Recognizing that proportional representation has a tendency to reward more extreme parties that make legislative compromises more difficult, states can remediate this by implementing a popular vote threshold, like Germany does, before allocating seats.\textsuperscript{235}

**CONCLUSION**

The Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate VRA Section 4(b)’s coverage formula nullifies the VRA’s preclearance provision and therefore effectively ends the most important piece of federal legislation protecting minority voting rights in a country that remains highly polarized on both racial and socio-economic grounds. Making matters worse, the Court left VRA Section 2 intact, which incentivizes the abuse of racial gerrymandering at the state legislative level to the overall detriment of racial minorities nationwide.

The Court’s decisions should not only be evaluated accord-

\textsuperscript{234} By this I mean that countries that use Proportional Representation to allocate legislative seats, including Germany, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, Finland, Austria, and others, have done a better job than countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada at remediating inequality and insuring higher living standards for all citizens. See, e.g., Tami Luhby, *Global Income Inequality: Where the U.S. Ranks*, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/08/news/economy/global_income_inequality/; see also Kochhar, supra note 52. Note also how countries with single member plurality systems of government, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States have pronounced regional cleavages, with a referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom, which took place in September 2014, Quebeckers having nearly voted for independence from the rest of Canada in 1995, and the United States with its pronounced red and blue state divide. See, e.g., Scotland Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014, 10:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441; Fred Hiatt, *The Red State/Blue State Divide is Worsening*, WASH. POST. (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hiatt-the-red-state-blue-state-divide-is-worsening/2013/04/21/d830b7a-a90c-11e2-8302-3c7e0e97057_story.html.

ing to the apparent desirability of their outcomes, but also according to their institutional legitimacy, jurisprudential soundness, and how these outcomes will affect and interact with both U.S. government and society. By these measures, the Court’s decision in *Shelby County* is an altogether problematic use of judicial review because it risks precipitating a backlash and retrogression against racial minority voting rights by state legislatures in a country with an inordinately high level of racial political polarization and a pronounced history of racial discrimination. The Roberts Court’s defense to this would be that Congress has authority to enact a new coverage formula, provided it is congruent and proportional to a pattern and practice of discrimination under the Court’s limited reading of Congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments. Congress, however, will most likely be unable to pass effective legislation to protect minority voters in the hyper-partisan political environment that characterizes today’s Washington.

In view of these challenges, what can be done? One option is for states to change their laws and allow bipartisan commissions to undertake redistricting, instead of their legislatures. However, this process can still be abused and will, based on living patterns, still lead to racial minority vote-dilution. The best outcome would be for states to revitalize American democracy by replacing today’s single member plurality system for electing representatives, at both the state and nationwide level, with a proportional representation paradigm that is currently used in many of the best-performing democracies as measured in terms of voter participation, economic growth, job creation and welfare state provision. Barring this outcome, *Shelby County* will exacerbate, rather than bridge, the racial and socio-economic divides that bedevil U.S. society.